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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ana Belem was only going to Arizona for a few days, or at least that is 
what she told her husband, Carlos Bermudez.1  She claimed that her cousin 
had an emergency and needed her assistance.2  As the sole provider of the 
family, Bermudez was unable to take off work to care for their son in his 
wife’s absence.  Thus in June of 2008, Belem and their twelve months old 
son Sage left their North Carolina home.3  Unbeknownst to Bermudez, the 
two were not coming back.  There was no family crisis in Arizona; it was 
just a cover Belem used to give herself time to illegally relocate their son to 
Mexico, her native country.4  
Unfortunately, Bermudez’s story is not unique.  He is only one of 
thousands of left-behind parents5 worldwide whose child has been taken by 
the other parent and unlawfully retained in another country.  In 2009 alone, 
the United States’ Department of State responded to 1,135 new parental 
abduction cases, involving 1,621 children.6  
When children are held in a country that is a signatory of the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
(Convention), the left-behind parent, like Bermudez, is empowered to 
demand that the foreign country oversee the prompt return of the child.7  
When applied properly, the Convention is the most useful mechanism 
assisting left-behind parents as they maneuver through foreign courts.  
                                                                                                                   
 1 Broken Laws and Bereaved Lives, International Child Abduction Hearings: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Global Health and Human Rights, H. Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Carlos Bermudez, father of 
child abducted to Mexico). 
 2 Id.  
 3 Id.  
 4 Id.  
 5 NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, FAMILY ABDUCTION: PREVENTION 
AND RESPONSE, at X (Patricia M. Hoff ed., 6th ed. 2009) (defining a left-behind parent as the 
parent from whom a child has been wrongfully taken, kept, or concealed). 
 6 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE 
CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 14 (Apr. 2010), http://www.travel.state. 
gov/abduction/resources/congressreport/congressreport_4308.html [hereinafter COMPLIANCE 
REPORT 2010]. 
 7 Amanda M. Waide, Note, To Comply or Not to Comply? Brazil’s Relationship with the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 39 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 273, 273 (2010).  
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However, too often Convention partners fail to comply.8  Mexico is one of a 
handful of countries that the State Department has repeatedly identified as 
either noncompliant or showing tendencies of noncompliance.9   
Bermudez knows this reality too well.  Since his son was kidnapped, 
Bermudez has participated in nine separate trials in Mexico, with several still 
ongoing.10  Because the Mexican legal system allows a large number of 
appeals, the enforcement of any decision is often delayed.11  For Bermudez, a 
family court judge has suspended any new proceedings, claiming he is 
waiting on documents from the first trial.12  
Delays in proceedings are only one of the challenges faced by left-behind 
parents trying to secure the return of their children from Mexico.13  The 
country has become one of the premier abduction destinations for American 
children.  Of the 1,135 new outgoing cases in 2009, 309 of them, including 
474 children, involved abductions to Mexico.14  That is 417% more cases 
than the second most common abduction destination of children taken from 
the United States.15  
Recently, the United States strengthened its stance on international child 
abduction.16  In 2012, the Senate passed a resolution calling for the safe and 
immediate return of two abducted children, Noor and Ramsey Bower, from 
Egypt.17  Just the year before, Congress introduced House Resolution 1940, 
which called for legislation that allows presidential action, including 
economic sanctions, against countries that condone child abduction, like 
Japan, India, and Egypt.18  These countries are not Convention partners and 
                                                                                                                   
 8 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2010, supra note 6, at 18–25 (assessing Convention compliance 
with regards to Convention partners’ central authority performance, judicial performance and 
law enforcement performance).  
 9 Id.  
 10 Hearings, supra note 1, at 3. 
 11 Id.  
 12 Id.  
 13 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2010, supra note 6, at 11.  
 14 Id. at 10, 14 (the term “outgoing cases” is being used according to the State Department’s 
definition referring to “cases in which a parent wrongfully removed a child from the United 
States or wrongfully retained him or her in another country”).  
 15 Id. (Canada was recorded as having the second highest incidence of reported abductions 
of children taken from the United States with seventy-four new outgoing cases).  
 16 DIPNOTE, Conversations with America: International Parent Child Abductions, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE OFFICIAL BLOG (Apr. 25, 2012), http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2012/04/25/con 
versations-america-international-parental-child-abductions. 
 17 S. Res. 477, 112th Cong. (2012) (enacted). 
 18 Bruce Gherbetti, Delay in Signing Hague Child Abductions Treaty Could Provoke 
Sanctions, JAPAN FILES (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/fl20120904hn.html. 
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have not criminalized parental abductions.19  Additionally, the Senate 
responded to the media attention that surrounded the David Goldman case in 
2008, which involved an American father fighting for the return of his son 
from Brazil.20  There, the Senate threatened Brazil with trade sanctions that 
would have subjected the country to a two billion dollar annual loss.21  
These efforts to force Convention participation and compliance are 
commendable, but the reality of the matter is that the number of children 
abducted to Japan, India, and Brazil together make up only a fraction of the 
number of children abducted to Mexico.22  In 2009, new outgoing cases from 
these three countries barely reached a quarter of the cases from Mexico.23  
And yet, Mexico has not seen a fraction of the pressure to comply with the 
Convention as these other countries have.  Perhaps more baffling is that the 
United States, despite having the highest incidence of outgoing child 
abductions in the world, has taken comparatively fewer protective measures 
to prevent abductions than other countries, including Mexico.24 
This Note sets out to explore factors that contribute to the difficulty in 
securing the prompt return of an abducted child from Mexico.  The Note then 
critiques and proposes suggestions for the United States’ current handling of 
the problem.  Part II of this Note will discuss the background of the 1980 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and 
Mexico’s pattern of noncompliance.  Part III will explore the United States’ 
efforts to promote Convention accession and compliance.  It will also discuss 
current restrictions and safeguards in place for children traveling into and out 
of the country.  Part IV of this Note will examine tools the United States can 
effectively utilize to respond to Mexico’s compliance deficiencies.  Finally, 
this Note will conclude by suggesting that the government use a variety of 
methods to address Mexico’s noncompliance, including preemptive 
measures.  
                                                                                                                   
 19 Id.  
 20 Waide, supra note 7, at 289–88. 
 21 Id.; see infra Part III (describing Goldman’s five year struggle to regain custody of his son).   
 22 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2010, supra note 6, at 2.  
 23 Id.   
 24 See infra Part III.B (comparing Mexico and the United States protective measures to 
prevent international child abduction); see also Mexico Country Specific Information, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_970.html (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2013) (describing Mexico’s entrance and exit requirements for minors traveling 
without both parents). 
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II.  THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND MEXICO’S HISTORY OF NONCOMPLIANCE 
A.  The Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction: Purpose and Background 
Prior to the 1980 Convention, it seemed nearly impossible to locate and 
secure the return of children abducted to foreign countries.25  Moreover, the 
frequency of abductions continued to grow as the world saw increased 
international travel, bi-national marriages, and divorce rates.26  In 1976, 
various country leaders acknowledged the need to collaboratively address the 
growing crisis.27  Twenty-three countries participated in drafting the Hague 
Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Convention), 
and adopted it in 1980.28 As of December 2012, sixty-nine countries have 
acceded to the convention.29  
The Convention provides a uniform legal framework among countries 
with different legal systems to facilitate the prompt return of a child 
wrongfully retained in a foreign country.30 Specifically, it “seeks to ‘restore 
the pre-abduction status quo and to deter parents from crossing borders in 
search of a more sympathetic court.’ ”31  At its most basic form, the Hague 
Convention instructs courts to ask one simple question: what is the child’s 
country of habitual residency?32  For instance, when a child is abducted from 
the United States to Mexico, the Mexican court must simply decide whether 
the child was living in the United States.33  If he was, then he should be 
promptly returned to the U.S. for any further legal proceedings regarding 
custody.34  
                                                                                                                   
 25 Donyale N. Leslie, Note, A Difficult Situation Made Harder: A Parent’s Choice Between 
Civil Remedies and Criminal Charges in International Child Abduction, 36 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 381, 385 (2008). 
 26 Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention (2012), HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INT’L LAW (2012), http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=24. 
 27 Leslie, supra note 25, at 385. 
 28 Id.   
 29 Hague Abduction Convention Country List, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF CONSULAR 
AFFAIRS, http://travel.state.gov/abduction/resources/congressreport/congressreprot_1487.html 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
 30 DIPNOTE BLOGGERS, supra note 16. 
 31 Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 988 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 
F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 32 DIPNOTE BLOGGERS, supra note 16.  
 33 Id.  
 34 Id.  
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The Convention drafters believed that the country of habitual residence, 
often where the child was born and possesses citizenship, has the most 
interest in resolving the conflict.35  As a result, they designed the Convention 
in a way that allows the country of habitual residence to arbitrate the merits 
of the underlying custody dispute.36  Thus, previous custody agreements are 
honored as the Convention prohibits foreign courts from deciding the merits 
of custody disputes.37 
The Hague Convention does not explicitly define the circumstances that 
determine habitual residence.38  Instead, “courts interpret the phrase 
according to its ordinary meaning and analyze habitual residence as a mixed 
question of fact and law, based on the circumstances of the particular case.”39 
Generally, when a child is born in the country where his parents have their 
habitual residence, then that country would be regarded as the child’s 
habitual residence.40  Place of birth, however, is not dispositive.41  Courts 
should consider the totality of the circumstances arising to and prevailing in 
the child’s living circumstances. This inquiry would include the history of 
the child’s residence, evidence of the parent’s mutual intent to fix the child’s 
location, and the settled nature of the family before the return request.42 
Nonetheless, a country is not compelled to return a child to the country of 
habitual residence in every abduction case.  The Convention establishes four 
discretionary exceptions that subordinate the obligation to return a child: (1) 
the proceedings to return the child commenced more than a year after the 
child was wrongfully removed; (2) the left-behind parent failed to exercise 
his custody rights at the time of removal or consented to the removal; (3) the 
                                                                                                                   
 35 Waide, supra note 7, at 275.  
 36 Id.  
 37 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, opened for 
signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, 19 I.L.M. 1501, art. 16 (1980) 
[hereinafter Hague Convention] (“The Contracting State to which the child has been removed 
or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits or rights of custody until it has 
been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention or unless an 
application under this Convention is not lodged within a reasonable time following receipt of 
the notice.”).  
 38 Id.  
 39 Hague Convention Chapter Advisory Comm., The Hague Convention on International 
Child Abduction: A Child’s Return and the Presence of Domestic Violence 8 (Sept. 2005) 
[hereinafter Advisory Comm. Report], http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/manuals/domViol/ 
appendixG.pdf.  
 40 Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 41 Id.  
 42 Waide, supra note 7, at 276. 
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child will be at grave risk of physical or psychological harm if he were 
returned; and (4) the return of the child would violate the fundamental 
principles of human rights.43  However, two factors limit the application of 
these Convention defenses.44  First, the drafters of the Convention intended 
for courts to construe the defenses narrowly.  Second, the Convention gives 
courts the discretion to return a child to the country of habitual residency if 
such action would promote the goals of the Convention.45  This discretion 
exists even when the criteria of one of the exceptions is met.46 
The first exemption in Article 12 of the Convention requires a showing 
that the child is settled into his new environment.47  This is to say that even 
when an action is commenced more than a year after removal, the child 
should still be returned if he has not yet acclimated to the new country.48  
However, a determination of whether the child is acclimated is not 
appropriate if the action is filed within a year of the wrongful removal.49  
Article 13 details the second discretionary exception,50 and requires a 
party opposing a child’s return to prove either of two things to successfully 
stop the action.51  The party may first demonstrate that the left-behind parent 
“was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or 
retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or 
retention.”52  This is to say that at the time of removal the left-behind parent 
was not exercising his parental rights.  Courts construe “exercising custodial 
rights” broadly.53  Generally, they infer that parents exercise custodial rights 
unless the opposing party demonstrates “clear and unequivocal abandonment 
of the child.”54  Once a showing of an exercise of custodial rights is 
established, the Convention dictates that the court should not deal with 
whether or not those rights were carried out well.55 
                                                                                                                   
 43 Hague Convention, supra note 37, arts. 12–13, 20.   
 44 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 39, at 12.  
 45 Id. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Hague Convention, supra note 37, art. 12. 
 48 Waide, supra note 7, at 276. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Hague Convention, supra note 37, art. 13. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Waide, supra note 7, at 277.  
 53 Hague Convention, supra note 37, art. 13.  
 54 Id. 
 55 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 39, at 18. 
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The third exception, also detailed in Article 13, prohibits the return of a 
child if “there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to 
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation.”56  Courts’ treatment of this defense suggests that it is not intended 
to be a “vehicle to litigate” based on the child’s best interest or where the 
child might be happiest,57 but instead, the defense is meant to determine only 
whether the child will suffer serious abuse if returned.58  Abducting parents 
claiming domestic abuse often raise this exception.59  However, many courts 
do not apply the grave risk defense absent evidence demonstrating that the 
violence would be aimed at the child.60 
In addition, Article 13 enables the Court to consider the desires of 
children who are of an age and maturity level appropriate to take such view 
into consideration.61  While the Convention does not indicate a specific age,62 
“the child must be capable of understanding the choice he or she is making” 
in order to invoke this defense.63  Judges in the United States have often 
approached this exception in one of two ways.64  Some judges hear a 
psychologist’s expert testimony on whether the child is of a sufficient age 
and maturity level to weigh in on his custody status.65  Other courts appoint a 
guardian ad litem or even an attorney to represent the child.66 
The final exception to returning a child to his country of habitual 
residence is found in Article 20 of the Hague Convention.67  Under this 
Article, courts have discretion to refuse to return a child if such return 
“would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State 
relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”68 This 
                                                                                                                   
 56 Hague Convention, supra note 37, art. 13. 
 57 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 39, at 18.  
 58 Id.  
 59 Id.  
 60 Waide, supra note 7, at 278. 
 61 Hague Convention, supra note 37, art. 13. 
 62 Id.  
 63 Waide, supra note 7, at 278. 
 64 Linda D. Elrod, “Please Let Me Stay”: Hearing the Voice of the Child in Hague 
Abduction Cases, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 663, 679–80 (2011).   
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.; see also Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002) (judge appointed a 
guardian ad litem for the children in the custody dispute); Kufner v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33, 37 
(1st Cir. 2008) (court appointed an attorney in dual role of guardian ad litem and attorney for 
children).  
 67 Hague Convention, supra note 37, art. 20. 
 68 Id.  
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defense has not been utilized in the United States to block the return of a 
child.69 
B.  Mexico’s History of Noncompliance with the Hague Convention 
Every year, the Department of State’s Office of Children’s Issues 
conducts an analysis of signatories’ compliance with the Convention.70  The 
compliance reports identify areas of concern where a country’s 
implementation of the Convention falls short of completing its obligations.71  
Relying in part on guidelines outlined in the Permanent Bureau of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law’s Guides to Good Practice, the 
Department considers three main compliance areas including: (1) central 
authority performance; (2) judicial performance; and, (3) law enforcement 
performance.72  Considering these factors, the report categorizes countries of 
concern as either not compliant or as demonstrating patterns of 
noncompliance; the former category being the more serious of the two.73  
Since 1999, nearly every compliance report has identified Mexico as either 
not compliant or demonstrating patterns of noncompliance.74   
1.  Mexican Central Authority Performance 
Historically, the United States’ Central Authority (USCA), the 
organization that handles Convention cases in the United States, has found it 
difficult to communicate directly with the Mexican Central Authority 
(MCA).75  In 2009, for instance, the USCA identified fifty-three unresolved 
cases that had been pending for eighteen months or longer following the 
application filing.76  The USCA and the U.S. embassy repeatedly asked the 
                                                                                                                   
 69 Id.  
 70 Compliance Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.travel.state.gov/abduction/resou 
rces/congressreport/congressreport_4308.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2012). 
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. 
 73 Id.  
 74 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2012 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ABDUCTION (Apr. 2012), http://www.travel.state.gov/ 
pdf/2012HagueComplianceReport.pdf [hereinafter COMPLIANCE REPORT 2012] (flagging 
Mexico as having enforcement problems, but not categorizing Mexico as either non-compliant 
or demonstrating patterns of non-compliance). 
 75 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2010, supra note 6, at 22 (when a country accedes to the 
Convention it must establish a central authority to handle Convention cases).  
 76 Id.  
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MCA for status updates on these unresolved cases but received no response 
for at least nineteen of them.77  Such difficulties have caused costly 
inconveniences for left-behind parents, as well as delays in processing return 
applications.78  Moreover, any type of delay is detrimental to left-behind 
parents whose return applications, in accordance with Article 12 of the 
Convention, can be denied if the child is found to have settled into the new 
environment.79 
The State Department attributes the MCA’s performance deficiencies to 
inadequate staffing.80  According to The Hague Permanent Bureau’s Guide 
to Good Practice, central authority staff should be “sufficient in numbers to 
cope with the workload.”81  In the USCA’s view, the MCA requires a larger 
allocation of resources and staff in order to comply with Convention 
requirements.82 
Notwithstanding these insufficiencies, the MCA’s performance has 
improved in the last couple of years.83  As detailed in the 2011 compliance 
report, the frequency of exchange in information and meetings between the 
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City and the USCA has increased.84  The MCA has 
also made efforts to improve the effectiveness of case management and to 
address judicial and law enforcement issues.85  Despite these recent 
improvements, Mexico maintains an alarming number of cases that continue 
to be wrongfully delayed and unresolved.86  In 2011, the State Department 
identified 117 outgoing cases that remained unresolved for more than 
eighteen months, eight-two of which were Mexican cases.87 
                                                                                                                   
 77 Id. at 23.  
 78 Id. at 22 (return applications are the Convention applications a left-behind parent files 
with the abducting country’s central authority to request the return of the child). 
 79 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 39, at 12. 
 80 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2010, supra note 6, at 23. 
 81 Id. (quoting the Hague Permanent Bureau’s Guide to Good Practice on Central Authority 
Performance, § 2.4.1).  
 82 Id.  
 83 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2011 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 5 (Apr. 2011), http://travel.state. 
gov/pdf/2011HagueComplianceReport.pdf [hereinafter COMPLIANCE REPORT 2011]. 
 84 Id.  
 85 Id.  
 86 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2012, supra note 74. 
 87 Id. 
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2.  Judicial Performance 
Mexico continues to experience frequent judicial delays with respect to 
hearings.  In several 2009 cases, sixteen to fifty-five months elapsed between 
the submission of a return application and the first court hearing.88  The State 
Department identifies three causal factors for these judicial delays:  
(1) lack of implementing legislation or procedures for 
Convention applications and many Mexican judges following 
inapposite procedures found in state civil codes in resolving 
such cases; (2) lack of understanding of the Convention by 
many Mexican judges . . .; and, (3) [taking parents] (TPs) 
absconding with the children when summoned to a 
hearing . . . .89 
Regarding the first causal factor, Mexican courts have traditionally shown 
a tendency to misapply Article 16 of the Convention by addressing the 
underlying custody issues of cases90 and adjudicating cases based on custody 
merits.91  Additionally, the application of the amparo process, a 
constitutionally based appeal in Mexico, continues to cause delays.92  TPs 
may file an amparo appeal alleging that the Convention violates their rights 
under the Mexican Constitution.93  In response, judges order an immediate 
stay of the Convention proceedings pending the adjudication of the 
underlying constitutional issue.94  Mexican precedent instructs judges to 
promptly dismiss such an appeal, as both the Mexican Supreme Court and 
Mexican federal courts have held that the Convention does not violate the 
Constitution’s due process requirements.95  Although lower courts have 
                                                                                                                   
 88 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2010, supra note 6, at 22.  
 89 Id. at 23 (defining a taking parent as the parent or person who abducted the child).  
 90 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2002–03 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION (Apr. 2003), http://www.travel. 
state.gov/pdf/2002-2003ComplianceReport.pdf [hereinafter COMPLIANCE REPORT 2002–03] 
(“[T]he only issues the court is supposed to examine are (a) whether the child was ‘habitually 
resident’ in another Hague state prior to the abduction or illegal retention; (b) whether the left-
behind parent had some form of custodial rights at the time; and (c) whether those rights were 
being exercised.”). 
 91 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2011, supra note 83, at 5. 
 92 Id. (amparo appeals can be filed multiple times). 
 93 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2010, supra note 6, at 23. 
 94 Id.  
 95 Id.  
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relied on these decisions,96 amparo appeals still subject the Convention 
process to frequent delays.97    
The second causal factor, a general lack of understanding of the 
Convention, seems fairly widespread throughout Mexican courts and 
agencies involved in the resolution process of Hague cases.98  This 
unfamiliarity was evidenced in 2009, when courts submitted extensive 
requests for information, including letters from USCA to determine whether 
the facts of a particular case met the Convention’s definition of international 
child abduction.”99  
The third causal factor, TPs fleeing with the children when summoned by 
court, occurs because neither the TP nor the children are secured following 
the court’s notification.100  Mexican judges can temporarily place children in 
a children’s protection service shelter of the Desarrollo Integral de la 
Familia.101  However, judges are reluctant to place children in these shelters 
absent evidence that the child is in danger under the TP’s care.102  
3.  Law Enforcement Performance 
Over the last decade Mexican law enforcement has been notoriously 
ineffective in its efforts to locate missing children.103  As previously 
mentioned, fifty-four cases were left unresolved in 2009.104  In thirty-eight of 
these cases, the USCA requested assistance from the MCA to locate the 
children with the help of Mexican law enforcement.105  In many instances the 
left-behind parent provided a last known street address and telephone 
number of the abducting parent and child.106  Still, Mexican authorities were 
unable to locate them.107  The State Department attributes this problem to 
two main factors.108  First, too few enforcement agencies are assigned to 
                                                                                                                   
 96 Id.  
 97 Id.  
 98 Id.  
 99 Id.  
 100 Id.  
 101 Id.  
 102 Id.  
 103 Compliance Reports, supra note 70. 
 104 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2010, supra note 6, at 22.   
 105 Id.  
 106 Id.  
 107 Id.  
 108 Id.  
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large territories and populations.109  Second, international parental abductions 
seem to be lower priority than other more violent criminal activities.110  
Whatever the cause, delays in determining location are particularly 
detrimental to the return process because Mexico does not open a case until 
the location of the child is known.111  “Since location starts a case, and a case 
must begin within a year to warrant automatic return, quickly locating a child 
in Mexico cannot be overemphasized.”112  
With respect to recent improvements, the MCA has partnered with the 
Agencia Federal de Investigacion to more actively search for children.113  
The effort has resulted in successfully locating several children in 
longstanding cases.114  Nevertheless, the majority of longstanding unresolved 
return applications remain pending because of law enforcement’s inability to 
locate abducted children.115   
C.  Case Example: Didier Combe—Five Years Later and Still Waiting  
Left-behind parents of children abducted to Mexico continue to 
experience unreasonable delays in court proceedings, inappropriate judicial 
implementation of Convention procedures, and too often, problems locating 
their children.116  The case of Didier Combe, a man whose daughter is being 
wrongfully retained in Mexico, provides a great example of this trend of 
noncompliance.117  In 2006 Combe, a U.S. citizen, was in the process of a 
divorce from Aline Rivas-Vera, a Mexican citizen.118  During the 
proceedings the two shared custody of their two and a half year old daughter, 
Chloe.119  On March 15, 2006, Rivas-Vera fled to Mexico with Chloe in 
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tow.120  Shortly thereafter, a circuit court in Missouri granted Combe full 
legal and physical custody of Chloe.121  
Since the abduction, a federal warrant has been issued for Vera’s arrest.122  
Unfortunately, potential criminal sanctions are of little comfort to a man who 
has not seen his child in seven years.  Combe filed a return application one 
month after the abduction and hired legal representation in Mexico City a 
few months later.123  Over the next two years, he made several trips to 
Mexico City to meet with the MCA regarding efforts to have Chloe returned 
to the United States.124  Although the Mexican government made numerous 
attempts to serve Rivas-Vera, law enforcement could not locate her for over 
a year because she went into hiding.125  Once in front of a Mexican family 
judge, Rivas-Vera further prolonged the process by appealing three times.126  
Although the appeals were denied, they caused eight months of delays.127  
Delays caused by difficulties in locating a child, appeals, and other issues 
can be particularly problematic.  As noted above, Article 12 of the Hague 
Convention gives a judge the discretion to deny a return application, even 
when the court has determined the child was wrongfully removed, if the 
child has become settled in his new environment.128  Long delays can 
contribute to a judge, unfamiliar with the proper application of the 
Convention, erroneously finding that a child has become settled and should 
not be returned.  In Combe’s case, on April 24, 2008, a judge determined that 
Chloe should stay in Mexico because she was accustomed to living there.129  
This decision does not comport with a proper application of the 
Convention.  Article 12 instructs that whether a child is settled in his 
environment should not be considered when the return application was filed 
within a year of the abduction.130  Combe filed the application a month after 
his daughter was abducted,131 thus the only question the judge should have 
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determined was which country was Chloe’s habitual residency at the time of 
the abduction.132 
Combe appealed the decision to the Mexican Supreme Court.133  In 
March 2009, a Mexican federal court overruled the family judge’s decision 
and ordered that Chloe be returned to the United States as soon as 
possible.134  Despite this ruling, which is consistent with the Convention 
articles, Chloe has not returned because she and Rivas-Vera are again in 
hiding135 and law enforcement has been unable to locate them.136 
III.  THE UNITED STATES’ EFFORTS TO PROMOTE CONVENTION 
COMPLIANCE AND ACCESSION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD   
A.  Recent Efforts to Enforce Convention Compliance 
The government has taken proactive steps towards encouraging 
compliance among the partners of the Convention.137  Moreover, it has 
encouraged nonparties to become signatories of the Convention.138  As 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton took a particular interest in children’s 
issues.139  In 2010, she created the position of Special Advisor to the Office 
of Children’s Issues and appointed long-time children advocate and 
Ambassador Susan S. Jacobs.140  Since being appointed, Special Advisor 
Jacobs has focused on raising awareness of the issues relating to international 
parental abduction in conjunction with continuing diplomatic efforts to 
improve Convention partners’ performance.141  A brief examination of these 
diplomatic and political efforts directed towards others countries, particularly 
Brazil, illustrate potential tactics that could effectively improve Mexican 
compliance.   
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1.  Pressure on Brazil  
Brazil acceded to the Convention in 2003,142 and has since been identified 
by the State Department as not compliant.143  In contrast to Mexico, judicial 
misapplication of the Convention is the principal causal factor of Brazil’s 
noncompliance.144 However, Brazilian judges share their Mexican 
counterparts’ tendency to adjudicate Convention cases based on the 
underlying custody issue.145  In making such merit based determinations, 
Brazilian courts have shown widespread favoritism towards Brazilian 
mothers.146  Additionally, courts have demonstrated an alarming pattern of 
allowing children, who have not yet reached an age of maturity, to make 
statements about where they would prefer to live.147  Finally, the Convention 
process in Brazil, like in Mexico, is sometimes disrupted by law enforcement 
deficiencies.148  Further, the wrongful retention of children is not an offense 
under the Brazilian penal code.149  As a result, law enforcement does not 
place a high priority on Convention cases.150 
David Goldman, a U.S. citizen, brought international parental abductions 
before the public’s eye151 during his five-year struggle in Brazilian courts to 
be reunited with his son.152  In June of 2004, his wife, Bruna, and son, Sean, 
departed for Brazil for what was supposed to be a two-week vacation to his 
wife’s native country.153  However, Goldman soon realized that his wife had 
no intention of returning.154  He subsequently filed a timely return 
application for his son, but it was denied on the basis that the boy should stay 
in Brazil with his mother.155   
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Bruna remarried a prominent attorney in Brazil, and shortly thereafter 
died in childbirth.156  Even after her death, Brazilian courts refused to return 
Sean to the United States.157 Instead the court granted guardianship and 
custody to his stepfather.158  After another negative ruling and appeal, a 
Brazilian federal court heard Goldman’s case and determined that, under the 
Convention, his son should be returned to the United States.159  However, the 
victory was short lived.160  Following the federal court’s ruling, a Supreme 
Court Justice issued a stay requiring Sean to remain with his Brazilian 
relatives until the Supreme Court could consider the case.161 
Although Goldman’s battle endured for nearly five years, he was lucky 
that it produced so much publicity.  In response to the stay, U.S. Senator 
Frank Lautenberg placed a hold on a trade bill that would have subjected 
Brazil to a loss of around $2.75 billion in benefits.162  The bill was to 
“provide export tariff relief to 130 countries, of which Brazil would be the 
fifth largest recipient.”163  The hold “was designed to exert additional 
pressure on Brazilian authorities to abide by the court order.”164  The 
Senator’s actions demonstrate that political pressure such as sanctions can 
induce Convention compliance. Shortly after the hold was placed in 
December of 2009, the stay on Sean was lifted.165  
There have been other Congressional initiatives to pressure Brazil into 
compliance with its obligations under the Convention.166  The Suspend 
Brazil GSP Act (Suspend Brazil Act), a U.S. House Resolution, was 
introduced in June of 2009, and called for the “suspen[sion of] the 
application of Generalized System of Preferences for Brazil until such time 
as Brazil complies with its obligations towards the United States under the 
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Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.”167  The 
bill was meant to “impress upon the judiciary, central authority, and law 
enforcement of Brazil the importance of abiding by their respective 
obligations” as imposed by the Convention.168  If adopted, the Suspend 
Brazil Act would have cost Brazil about $2 billion annually in trade 
benefits.169  However, the bill eventually died in committee.170  Perhaps it 
lost support when part of its purpose, to ensure the immediate return of Sean 
Goldman, was fulfilled that same year.171 Nevertheless, the return of one 
child, when many other children are still wrongly retained,172 seems to be 
only a small triumph in the big picture. 
The International Child Abduction Prevention Act of 2009 (Abduction 
Prevention Act) was proposed almost concurrently with the Suspend Brazil 
Act.173  The resolution sought to “ensure compliance with the 1980 Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction by 
countries with which the United States enjoys reciprocal obligations . . . .”174  
Unlike the Suspend Brazil Act, the Abduction Prevention Act was not 
directed specifically at Brazil.  Instead, it was designed to affect any country 
that was not a Convention partner or demonstrated patterns of 
noncompliance.175  
The Abduction Prevention Act was not enacted.176  Had it been, the 
government would have gained much greater means of combating 
noncompliance.  When countries consistently fall short of their Convention 
obligations, the Abduction Prevention Act would have authorized the 
President to use a variety of options to exert pressure to comply.177  Such 
action could have included delays or cancellation of scientific or cultural 
exchanges, restrictions on visas issued to nationals of such country, 
limitations or suspensions of United States development or security 
                                                                                                                   
 167 Suspend Brazil GSP Act, H.R. 2702, 111th Cong. (2009) (died in committee). 
 168 Id. (in addition to encouraging compliance with the Hague, the bill was drafted in 
response to the custody difficulties facing David Goldman within the Brazilian courts in 
2009). 
 169 Waide, supra note 7, at 295.  
 170 Suspend Brazil GSP Act, supra note 167. 
 171 Waide, supra note 7, at 296. 
 172 COMPLIANCE REPORT 2011, supra note 83, at 12–13. 
 173 International Child Abduction Prevention Act of 2009, H.R. 3240, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 174 Id.   
 175 Id.  
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. § 204(a).  
236 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:217 
 
 
assistance, or ordering the heads of United States agencies not to issue 
licenses.178  Furthermore, the Resolution would have established mechanisms 
to provide left-behind parents with more assistance and aggressive advocacy 
in foreign countries.179    
2.  Pressure to Accede to the Convention—Japan, India, and Egypt    
The United States has also engaged in a considerable amount of 
diplomacy with non-partners of the Convention in hope of inducing 
accession.180  These efforts are important because when a child is abducted to 
a country that is not a partner of the Hague Convention, the left-behind 
parent only has remedies under that country’s laws.181  In recent efforts, the 
Senate unanimously passed the International Parental Child Abduction 
Resolution (Parental Abduction Resolution) on December 4, 2012.182  The 
Resolution condemns international parental abduction and calls on countries 
to join and fully comply with the Convention.183  In doing so, it singles out 
Japan, India and Egypt for being non-Convention partners that are also 
among the top ten countries to which children abducted from the United 
States are taken.184  While the Resolution does urge those Convention 
partners identified by the State Department as noncompliant or showing 
patterns of noncompliance to fulfill their commitments under the treaty, its 
two main focuses are: (1) to encourage non-partners of the Convention to 
accede and develop mechanisms for returning abducted children expediently; 
and (2) to increase the services and resources available to help left-behind 
parents secure the return of their child.185  While these objectives are 
important, they should not subordinate specific efforts to enforce Convention 
compliance. Otherwise, the efforts to encourage a country to become a 
partner of a treaty would seem in vain if there is no continued pressure to 
comply with it.  
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B.  Mexican Diplomacy Over the Past Decade  
Based on State Department compliance reports, between 1999 and the 
present, the United States government seems to have taken a diplomatic 
route to encourage Mexican compliance instead of exerting pressure through 
economic sanctions.186  Throughout the new millennium, the USCA took 
action to address the MCA’s lack of communication regarding status updates 
and general news on pending Hague cases.187  The Office of Children’s 
Issues and the USCA met with the MCA on separate occasions, and the 
USCA attended bi-national meetings with the Mexican Consulate to discuss 
communication problems.188  Moreover, the 2011 compliance report marked 
considerable improvements in the MCA regarding consistent 
communications with the USCA.189 
C.  Preventive Measures in General and Specific to Mexico  
Although Mexico has been noncompliant with regards to their application 
of the Convention, the country has passed several regulations that protect 
children from being wrongfully removed from Mexico.190  These regulations 
generally take the form of travel requirements.191  Mexican Immigration 
Authorities require the consent of both parents before any minor is allowed 
to enter or leave the county. This requirement applies to minors of any 
nationality.  In order to comply with the requirement, a parent traveling alone 
with a minor must provide a written statement of consent from the absent 
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parent.192  Further, in order to even obtain a passport for a minor child, the 
Mexican Foreign Ministry officials require the signature of both parents.193  
This allows one parent to prevent the issuance of a valid passport by 
withholding consent.194  In addition, traveling on a parent’s passport is not 
allowed.195  The effect of these procedures, when properly administered, is to 
prevent a minor from crossing the Mexican border without the explicit 
consent of both parents.  
United States regulations regarding international travel of minors are 
relatively relaxed compared to Mexico’s.196  United States Customs does 
recommend that parents traveling with minors carry a notarized note of 
permission from the other parent in his or her absence.197  Without the letter, 
the parent may be detained until the circumstances of the child traveling 
without both parents can be fully assessed;198 however, a statement of 
permission is not required as it is in Mexico.199   
It is both troubling and surprising that the United States experiences more 
cases of parental abductions than Mexico does, and yet implements fewer 
safeguards to prevent them.200  The added cost to the country seems minimal 
when compared to the benefits derived.  Implementing such a requirement 
would not be burdensome, as parents seeking to travel internationally with 
their children but without their spouse would have to exert the minimal time 
and money required to obtain a notarized consent form.  The waiting time at 
customs for all travelers would likely increase slightly because officials 
would need to check that minors had all the required paper work, and in 
some instances, authorities might even have to check a database to confirm 
the validity of certain documents.201  However, these small infringements 
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seem insignificant if their application would prevent parents from illegally 
taking children out of the country. 
IV.  THE NEED FOR A BETTER RESPONSE TO ADDRESS MEXICO’S 
NONCOMPLIANCE 
A.  The Convention Lacks a Mechanism to Address Compliance  
The Hague Convention offers an effective approach for countries to 
address international child abduction in a consistent and fair manner.  
However, its drafters failed to provide a mechanism within the Convention to 
ensure that other signatories fulfill their obligations, or for countries to use in 
order to enforce compliance among other contracting states.202 Thus, 
countries rarely encounter ramifications when they fail to comply with their 
obligations.  Professors Paul Beaumont and Peter McEleavy articulated this 
shortcoming best: when “faced with sustained noncompliance there is little 
Contracting States can do; certainly there is no mechanism proscribed within 
the text of the Convention . . . . Ultimately, in the absence of any sanction the 
operation of the Convention depends upon the goodwill of the signatory 
States.”203 
B.  A More Aggressive Approach Should Include Potential Sanctions 
The United States should no longer rely on the good faith of Mexico to 
fulfill its obligations under the Convention.  This is not to say that the State 
Department and USCA have not been proactive in strengthening the 
implementation of the Convention in Mexico and other noncompliant 
countries.  Since 1999, both the USCA and representatives of the State 
Department have diligently met with the MCA to discuss deficiencies in 
Mexico’s implementation of the Convention.204  In addition to diplomatic 
efforts, the USCA publishes annual reports on the compliance of other 
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parties to the Convention.205  In an introductory letter published in the 2010 
compliance report, Janice Jacobs, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Consular Affairs, commented on the importance of these reports in the 
government’s efforts to promote effective implementation of the 
Convention.206  She wrote: “Compliance is an ongoing challenge for many 
countries.  Consequently, continuing evaluation of treaty implementation in 
partner countries and in the United States is vital for its success.”207 
These diplomatic measures certainly play an important role in dealing 
with noncompliant partners.  However, they simply fall short in their ability 
to effectuate a significant change in countries like Mexico, where the 
Convention obligations are not a priority.208  Thus, the United States should 
take a more aggressive approach in dealing with noncompliance. 
It is in this area that the United States legislators might draw inspiration 
from an examination of the Goldman case in Brazil.  Congress failed to enact 
the Suspend Brazil Act and the Abduction Prevention Act.209  Nevertheless, 
those two bills, as well as Senator Lautenberg’s trade hold, demonstrate how 
Congress can encourage countries to meet their obligations under the Hague 
Convention. 
For instance, the case of David Goldman should have been very simple.  
Many left-behind parents, particularly those whose children have been 
abducted to Mexico, encounter obstacles because the location of their 
children is unknown.210  Goldman knew exactly where in Brazil his wife and 
son were located.  His return application was filed with the Brazilian Central 
Authority within a month of his son’s abduction, well within the one-year 
deadline.  Further, Goldman and his wife were married in the United States, 
and their son was born and raised in the country; there was no question that 
the United States was Sean’s habitual residency.  Brazil’s failure to promptly 
return Sean demonstrates how Brazilian judges “brazenly disregarded the 
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Hague Convention.”211  After five years of Hague Convention diplomacy, 
Brazil only returned Sean to the United States when Senator Lautenberg 
threatened to suspend $2 billion in Brazilian trade benefits.  This example 
illustrates how diplomacy can fall short of the effectiveness of monetary 
sanctions. 
The political pressure that effectively combated Brazil’s judicial 
deficiencies might also prove successful against Mexico’s law enforcement 
problems.  Brazil’s poor judicial performance seems to be a product of 
judges’ subordination of Convention Articles to Brazilian laws and cultural 
preferences.  This was evident in the Goldman case when the Supreme Court 
judge issued a stay even after a lower court determined that the Convention 
required Sean be returned to the United States.  Similarly, Mexico’s law 
enforcement issues are predominantly caused by the low priority that child 
abduction cases take in comparison to other responsibilities.212  The 
important connection here is that both compliance issues stem from 
deliberate subordination of the country’s Convention obligations.  The 
successful outcome in the Goldman case demonstrates that when compliance 
problems are a product of deliberate misbehaving or inaction, political 
pressure can effectively impress upon a country the importance of fulfilling 
its obligations under the Convention.  
A bill similar to the Suspend Brazil Act or the International Abduction 
Prevention Act may be required to compel Mexico to take its law 
enforcement performance seriously.  Considering the many trade agreements 
the United States shares with Mexico, something like the International 
Abduction Prevention Act would probably be most effective because it 
would empower the president to use an array of persuasive tools to force 
compliance.213  This includes political approaches that would not affect trade 
agreements.214  For instance, the President could restrict the number of visas 
issued to Mexican nationals when the State Department designates the 
country as a Country of Noncompliance.215  To increase the incentive for 
Mexican officials to act promptly, the President could target specific visas of 
officials and their families, who are in a position to officiate change in the 
handling of Hague cases.  Because Mexican officials and other powerful 
families often have residencies in the United States or send their children to 
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educational institutions here, denying their visas might create a powerful 
incentive to address the Hague compliance concerns.  Moreover, the Act 
would be beneficial for its ability to affect compliance in more than just 
Mexico.  There are several countries that, like Mexico, have consistently 
been recognized as countries demonstrating patterns of noncompliance.216  
Legislation, like the International Abduction Prevention Act, should be 
implemented to allow the government with a tool to take action against these 
noncompliant countries.  
In contrast to law enforcement performance, Mexico’s judicial 
performance issues are often caused by unfamiliarity with the Convention.  
Political pressure would not remedy improper judicial handling of cases 
caused by judges’ unfamiliarity with the Convention.  Instead, a better 
solution would involve educating Mexico’s judges on the proper application 
of the Convention in abduction disputes.217 
C.  More Progressive Preventive Measures 
In addition to political pressure and educational efforts, the United States 
should also implement more progressive prevention measures to reduce the 
occurrence of parental abductions.  Implementing an improved system to 
stop children from crossing the border, beyond the United States’ 
jurisdiction, will help ensure that children are not illegally isolated from one 
parent.  The Child Passport Issuance Alert Program (CPIAP) is an excellent 
program already in place that promotes this goal.218  The program alerts 
parents who have registered with CPIAP if the State Department receives an 
application for a passport in their child’s name.219  In this way, the procedure 
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warns parents of possible plans for international travel involving their 
child.220   
However, additional restrictions on actual international travel involving 
children should also be strengthened.  It seems rather ironic that Mexico, 
where Convention compliance is problematic, has implemented stricter 
procedures than the United States has to prevent the wrongful removal of 
children.221 The most obvious example is that currently, a parent traveling 
out of the United States with a child is not required to carry evidence of 
permission to take the child abroad.222  A better system would require these 
parents to carry a notarized letter of consent from the child’s other parent, 
proving permission to travel.  Such a procedure would not prevent 
abductions like Sean Goldman, where the abducting parent initially had 
permission to take the child abroad.223  However, Didier Pier’s ex-wife 
would not have been able to illegally take his daughter to Mexico had she 
been required to show a notarized letter of consent.224    
In 2004, a bill was introduced to the House that called for the creation of 
a national registry of custody orders.225  “A national registry of custody and 
visitation orders provides a single point of contact for courts and law 
enforcement to verify the validity of a custody order.”226  Such a registry, 
coupled with authority to take vulnerable children into temporary protective 
custody would strengthen the authority law enforcement has to prevent 
abductions.227  Law enforcement efforts encounter challenges that make 
intervening in a family abduction situation more difficult.  For instance, law 
enforcement officers often lack arrest warrants for the abducting parent or 
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even knowledge of who has true custody rights over the child.228  One 
example of this difficulty is a particularly frustrating case described by 
former chairman of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
during a legislative committee hearing in 2004.229  That case involved a 
mother whose son was abducted despite police intervention.  The child’s 
school alerted the mother when her son’s father arrived to pick him up. Since 
the father was not authorized to do so, the school also notified the police.230 
The father presented an outdated custody order to the police documenting 
that the parents shared joint custody. Although a current custody order 
granted the mother sole custody, she did not have a copy present to show the 
police.231 As a result, the police allowed the father to take the child.232  To the 
mother’s despair, her son boarded a plane with his father that night, and 
traveled to a country that is not a signatory of the Convention.233  Despite 
great efforts, as of 2004, the mother has had only two visits with her son over 
five years—both under the supervision of the abducting father.234  A national 
registry of custody orders would have allowed the police officers to easily 
access the current custody order to discover that the father had no right to 
pick up the child.  
Furthermore, the government should consider creating a “cannot travel” 
list linked to the national registry system that specifically targets traveling 
minors.  A child’s name would be added to the list and would only prevent 
international travel if a judge specifically added a provision in the custody 
agreement that prohibited the child from traveling abroad.  By linking the 
cannot travel list to the national registry system, the minor’s name would be 
automatically added to or removed from the list the moment a court 
registered a custody agreement into the registry system.   
Since the United States shares a border with Mexico, enabling individuals 
to drive to the country, the United States should coordinate with Mexican 
border control and customs agents to yield the best results in the effort to 
reduce the occurrence of child abductions.  Mexican law already places 
traveling restrictions on children traveling across its borders without both 
parents present.  However, these laws, like the provisions of the Hague 
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Convention, are not effective if they are ignored.  Coordination could 
provide the United States with some oversight ability to ensure that Mexican 
border patrols are requiring the proper documentation for children to enter 
the country.  Moreover, any coordination efforts should include providing 
Mexican custom agents access to the “cannot travel list.”  Thus, access into 
Mexico for a minor would require the child’s passport to be cross-referenced 
with the list.  This level of coordination would mean that whether flying or 
driving, abducting parents would face the same obstacles if attempting to 
wrongfully transport their child to Mexico. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The United States cannot spend another decade hoping that gentle 
diplomacy will encourage Mexico to prioritize its Convention obligations.  
Instead, it should diversify its response to include diplomacy, educational 
initiatives, and political pressure through economic sanctions and other 
creative means.  While these solutions are not perfect, the government should 
spend an equal amount of time strengthening preemptive measures to lower 
the overall occurrence of international parental abductions.  As the country 
most heavily affected by this global phenomenon, the United States should 
lead Convention partners in creating a uniform approach to deal with 
noncompliant behavior.  
 
  
